ures prepared by the Bureau of Economic Analysis () of the rates of return on foreign direct investment in the United States () and on U.S. direct investment abroad (). It compares these rates of return with those on all-U.S.-business investment and discusses possible explanations for the relatively low rates of return on .
Last year,  introduced two alternative measures of the rate of return on direct investment that were based on  estimates of the direct investment positions valued at current-period prices: The return on direct investment positions at market value, which is a measure of financial returns to direct investment, and the return on direct investment positions valued at current cost, which is a measure of economic returns on direct investment from current operations.
 These alternative measures overcome a major limitation of estimates of rates of return based on historical costs-the noncomparability of investments that differ considerably in age and therefore in priceby presenting estimates on a consistent valuation basis. Table  shows rates of return for  and  based on market value and on current cost compared with a market rate of return for all U.S. businesses; it also shows rates of return for  and  based on historical costs.
 For both  and , the rates of return at current-period prices are lower, on average, than the rates of return at historical costs. However, the differences are much larger for  than for  because the adjustment needed to restate direct investment positions from historical costs to current-period prices is much larger for . The data are limited to the period from  or  to  because the complete information on equity flows and equity positions that is required for the market-value measure is unavailable for earlier years.
. This price adjustment is larger for  because most  occurred in the 's and 's and thus tends to be "older" than , most of which occurred in the 's.
For , the rates of return at market value and at current cost are similar, on average, to the rates of return for all U.S. businesses. However, for , the rates of return at market value and at current cost are considerably below the rates of return for all U.S. businesses. (The historicalcost rates of return for  are also quite low.) The remainder of this article examines the question of why the rates of return on  are so low relative to the rates of return on domestic investments. 
Returns on 
In examining rates of return on , it is important to note that a multinational company tries to maximize its total profits around the world in deciding where to invest, where to produce, and where to realize its income. As a result, a multinational company structures its operations, costs, and product pricing across countries to maximize its global profits rather than to maximize profits on an individual investment or even on all of its investments in a single country. It may accept a below-average profit to gain access to the large U.S. market or to scarce raw materials. Alternatively, it may accept low returns on some parts of its operations to take advantage of economies of scale and technological efficiencies in other parts of its operations. In addition to these types of operational-or industrial organization-factors, multinationals also take into account a number of other factors, such as differences across countries in the cost and availability of capital, in expected returns on investment, in the tax treatment of income, and in tariffs and nontariff barriers.

The low rates of return on  appear to reflect certain long-term factors associated with the operations of multinational companies and the effects of a number of transitional factors that led to a surge in  in the 's. In the 's, current-account surpluses in Japan and several other countries generated excess funds available for investment. Funds were attracted to the United States by average yields on U.S. investments that were higher than those on home-country investments; this spread allowed foreign investors to accept yields that were below the average yield on U.S. investments. Further, depreciation of the dollar against most foreign currencies in the latter half of the 's increased potential long-term yields for those investors who believed that the U.S. dollar was undervalued. The combination of these factors meant that investments that had looked attractive from an operations perspective now also looked attractive from an investment perspective. The resulting surge in  in the 's meant that much of the investment on which the rates of return are calculated was relatively new, and new investments typically have lower rates of return than more mature investments. Moreover, a consid-. There has been much discussion about the relative importance of costof-capital and macroeconomic explanations versus industrial-organization explanations for direct investment. Most analysts concede that both have a role in direct investment but that industrial-organization explanations tend to have a larger role than the other explanations. See, for example, Graham and Krugman in Foreign Direct Investment, -. erable portion of this new  consisted of acquisitions of financially distressed U.S. companies that foreign companies presumably hoped to restructure and restore to financial health.
Long-term factors associated with the goal of maximizing profits on a global basis rather than on an individual-country basis also may have held down the rates of return on . These factors included the following: Economies of scale and the advantages of vertical integration, differences between countries in the treatment of taxes, and avoidance of tariffs and nontariff barriers.
The analysis that follows covers the rates of return on  for  of the  countries that were the largest direct investors in the United States during the last decade.
 In , these  countries accounted for over  percent of cumulative , and the top  accounted for over  percent (table ). It should be noted that underlying economic conditions and motivations for direct investment vary markedly among these countries, and it is difficult to generalize about the factors leading to low rates of return on their direct investments.
. Although the Netherlands Antilles'  position ranks eighth among all countries, it is excluded from the analysis because of the unique nature of its inward investment, which resulted from its activity as an offshore financial center (offshore financial centers were created to avoid certain interest-rate controls, bank lending restrictions and reserve requirements, and other regulatory constraints). Additionally, it had a favorable tax treaty with the United States that offered an exemption from the withholding tax on certain interest payments from U.S. affiliates to their Antillean parents. Consequently, foreign corporations made large investments in the United States through their Antillean affiliates rather than investing directly in the United States.
However, over the past decade, the Netherlands Antilles' share of total  has declined substantially. Its current-dollar position has remained fairly constant since , while its real share of total  has declined from  percent in  to  percent in . This downtrend can be partly explained by the elimination of U.S. withholding taxes on interest payments to foreigners in , which largely nullified the Netherlands Antilles' unique tax advantage. 
Transitional factors
Differences in average yields.-During much of the last decade, average yields on investments in the top  investor countries were below those in the United States (table ) . Between  and , the average real rate of return on total invested capital-debt and equity combined-was . percent in these countries, compared with . percent in the United States. The average yield on debt in these countries was . percent, compared with . percent; the average yield on equities was . percent, compared with . percent. 3. For the United States and the top 10 investor countries, average total returns are a weighted average of the real long-term interest rate and the earnings/price ratio, with the real long-term interest rate receiving a 35-percent weight and the earnings/price ratio receiving a 65-percent weight. These weights represent the typical financial structure of countries that value their debt/equity ratios at market value.
FDIUS Foreign direct investment in the United States
For several of these major investor countries, the difference between returns on direct equity investments was substantial. For example, Japanese investors received an average yield of . percent on their equity  between  and , compared with a yield of . percent on Japanese equities. Thus, returns on Japanese investments in the United States raised Japanese investors' aggregate yields, even though they were lower than the all-U.S.-business average.
Depreciation of the dollar.-A second and more important factor increasing  in the 's was the decline in the value of the U.S. dollar. In the latter half of the 's, the real value of the dollar declined  percent, and foreign firms more than doubled their direct investment position. This surge in  was similar to one that occurred between  and , when the dollar depreciated about  percent and  more than tripled.
In the latter half of the 's, overseas investors presumably believed that the dollar was undervalued and that future returns to dollardenominated direct investments would be well above their current values. U.S. firms' assets looked undervalued to those who believed that the dollar was below its long-run equilibrium and purchasing-power-parity value. Although it is difficult to determine the long-run equilibrium value for the dollar, a number of indicators sup-    ported the view of investors who believed the dollar was undervalued. For example, observed differences in real asset prices-such as those between Japanese and U.S. real estate and stock market investments-as well as estimates of the purchasing power of the dollar and of relative U.S. unit labor costs, suggested the dollar was undervalued.
 As chart  shows, the surges in  in both the late 's and the late 's oc-. According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development estimates of purchasing-power parity, the dollar was undervalued by roughly  percent against the currencies of the major industrialized economies in . Estimates by the Federal Reserve Board indicated that U.S. unit labor costs were roughly  percent below those of the other major industrialized countries. For a different perspective on the effect of the dollar 1. Income is measured as total receipts less total deductions after total net tax liability, as published by the Internal Revenue Service. Total receipts less total deductions, after taxes, have been adjusted to remove foreign source income and to add the part of the capital consumption adjustment in the national income and product accounts that adjusts for consistent accounting at historical cost. Total assets is that published by the Federal Reserve Board in Balance Sheets for the U.S. Economy, 1960-91; the published totals have been adjusted to exclude claims on foreign affiliates. In this measure of total assets, tangible assets are valued at historical cost, and claims on other nonfinancial corporations are excluded.
NOTE.-Rate of return is measured as net income to total assets. curred when the dollar was below its  value, which may be regarded as a rough indicator of the dollar's equilibrium value.
Rates of return on new direct investments.-The combined effects of higher relative rates of return on investments in the United States and the depreciation of the dollar made U.S. returns look particularly attractive to overseas companies that had increased profits from sales to U.S. markets and had thereby accumulated substantial cash reserves. For these firms, increasing on , see Graham and Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment, - and -.
their U.S. presence through direct investment was attractive from an investment as well as an operations perspective. The combination of these factors may even have encouraged companies abroad to buy financially distressed U.S. companies as long-term investments. Presumably, foreign companies either believed that they could turn their U.S. investments around over time by using their expertise in product development, process technology, and management, or they believed that they could achieve higher returns from an appreciation of the dollar. During the 's, about three-fourths of all  was for acquiring existing companies, and about one-fourth was for establishing new companies. For the companies established, rates of return were low or negative because of the startup costs that all new firms experience. For the companies acquired, rates of return were already low or negative: Between  and , the rate of return on assets for U.S. companies in the year before their acquisition by foreigners was . percent, compared with . percent for all U.S. nonfinancial companies (table , chart ).

In addition, the foreign owners' newly acquired companies not only began with below-average returns, but presumably these returns were lowered further as owners restructured these companies by investing in new plant and equipment and in modernization of older plants, by writing-off and closing obsolete units, by increasing marketing efforts, and by aggressively pricing their products to regain market share.
Recent developments.-By , many of the transitional factors that had encouraged direct investment in the United States were no longer present. Other countries' current-account surpluses with the United States were reduced. Multinational companies needed to reduce debt and rebuild their balance sheets, and their bankers needed to limit credit and meet higher capital standards. At the same time, the relative real rates of return on investments were reversed, as U.S. real interest rates and returns to equities decreased in relation to those abroad (table ). In late  and early , the slide in the value of the dollar stopped, and its value began to increase, which raised the cost to foreign investors of new direct investments in the United States. These developments combined to produce a sharp drop in  from . billion in  to . billion in .
With the slowdown in new , the rates of return on existing  should rise as these investments mature. Rates of return on  have shown this pattern, and there is some evidence that rates of return on  have tended to rise over time as well.
 However, long-term factors may continue to hold down  rates of return.
Long-term factors
Vertical integration.-One fundamental reason for foreign companies to make direct investments in other countries is to achieve vertical integration.
 Owning both "upstream" raw material and production facilities and "downstream" distribution outlets may make it easier to further penetrate foreign markets. Through U.S. affiliates, foreign parent companies can better design, manufacture, distribute, and service products for the special requirements of the U.S. market. Either through resale of the foreign parent's products by their U.S. affiliates or through sales of the parent's products as inputs to the affiliates, increased sales of the parent's products can achieve economies of scale in home-country production, resulting in lower unit production costs for their products.
Besides company affiliation, U.S. affiliates of foreign multinational companies cite other reasons for relying on imports from the parent company, including product quality, assured sources of supply, and specialized product needs. Presumably, vertical integration and maximizing total company profits also play a role. Whatever the reasons, foreign-owned affiliates do have a higher propensity to import than do U.S. multinational companies in the United States. Imports by U.S. affiliates of foreign multinationals accounted for  percent of their total purchases of inputs in , compared with  percent for U.S. multinational companies (table ). Part of the higher propensity to import is explained by the practice of using U.S. affiliates mainly as distribution outlets. Overall, U.S. affiliates' imports for resale as a share of their total sales was  percent in ; for several direct investors, the share was much higher (table ) .
With a vertically integrated company, the profits resulting from economies of scale can be allocated among the parent and its affiliates in order to maximize total returns. Such decisions can affect rates of return on individual investments. For example, a company that requires access to a scarce raw material may accept a lower rate of return on its "upstream" investments in mining because such access will raise its global profits. Alternatively, a company may accept lower returns on its "downstream" operations because, through vertical integration, it can raise total sales and take advantage of economies of scale and technological efficiencies that raise its total profits.
Taxes.-Differences in tax treatment across countries can significantly affect both the location of direct investment and, through "transfer pricing," the distribution of profits between parent and affiliate.
 If the effective tax rate on the domestic income of the foreign parent is lower than that on the income earned by the U.S. affiliate, the company can raise its total return by shifting income from the affiliate to the parent. This is achieved through use of transfer prices for transactions between the affiliate and its parent, whereby the company raises the price of exports to the affiliate and lowers the price of imports from the affiliate. In table , effective tax rates on income from investments in U.S. affiliates are compared with those on income from domestic investments for the top  foreign investor countries (as before, excluding the Netherlands Antilles). Computations of effective tax rates are subject to considerable uncertainty and are sensitive to the assumptions made regarding such variables as inflation and the financing mix. However, the rates in table , which are derived from a recent study on effective tax rates by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (), show that foreign parents in all but one of the  major investor countries may have an incentive to transfer income from their U.S. affiliates to themselves. NOTE.-The effective tax rate is calculated as the difference between the return before corporate taxes that is required to generate a 5-percent return before personal taxes, and the return after both corporate and personal taxes divided by the return before corporate taxes. The results are based on the following assumptions: Investment financing includes one-third each from intercompany debt, new equity, and reinvested earnings; the source of funds for financing is from the parent's home country; inflation is at a 4.5-percent annual rate; and the top tax rate is used for personal income.
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Taxing Profits in a Global Economy: Domestic and International Issues. Paris, 1991, tables 5.4, 5.8, and 5.11. eigners to invest abroad.

In recent years, direct investments in the U.S. auto industry were presumably related to actual and potential restrictions on vehicle exports to the United States. In addition, direct investment in several industries-televisions, typewriters, semiconductors, and automobiles-may have been related to antidumping suits and antidumping duties against foreign producers of these products. In these cases, the motive for direct investment may be to avoid tariffs and nontariff barriers in order to maximize total company returns, rather than to maximize returns on the direct investment. For example, a foreign manufacturer can avoid antidumping duties by exporting parts and components, on which there is no duty, for final assembly by the U.S. affiliate, rather than exporting the finished product, on which antidumping duties would be levied.
Importance of country-specific factors
The complex interrelationship among the factors that have caused rates of return to be lower for  than for all U.S. businesses is perhaps best demonstrated by an examination of the direct investment activities of companies from different countries. This section contrasts the activities of the two largest investor countries-Japan and the United Kingdom (table ) . Together, these two countries accounted for nearly one-half of the  position on a historical-cost basis in . In , the United Kingdom had the largest position, and it maintained that standing during the 's; Japan had the fifth largest position in  . For a discussion of how foreign direct investment is motivated by the desire to avoid tariffs and nontariff barriers, see "Strengthening  Antidumping Rules," Economic Report of the President (Washington, : U.S. Government Printing Office, ): ; and U.S. Congress, U.S. Trade Restraints: Effects on Foreign Investment, report prepared by James K. Jackson (Washington, : Library of Congress, ). and the second largest position at the end of the 's.
In terms of Japan's rates of return and the factors that have driven these returns, Japanese  was typical of  as a whole during the last decade. Large current-account surpluses in the 's in combination with relatively low rates of return in Japan led to large flows of direct investment capital from Japanese companies that were seeking higher returns in the United States. Low rates of return for U.S. companies in the year prior to their acquisition, along with high restructuring costs after acquisition, led to low earnings by affiliates of Japanese parents. Vertical integration, indicated by U.S. affiliates' heavy reliance on imports for immediate resale, and practices related to vertical integration, such as transfer pricing, further depressed returns on direct investment.
 Effective tax rates on the domestic income of Japanese parents were lower than those on the income of their U.S. affiliates, which created an incentive to shift profits from the United States to Japan. Finally, tariffs and nontariff barriers, such as Voluntary Restraint Agreements ('s) and antidumping suits and duties, may have induced Japanese companies to substitute assembly and production plants in the United States for final goods exports from Japan.
By contrast, for British , rates of return and the factors that have driven these returns are largely dissimilar to those for all . Throughout the 's, the United Kingdom maintained only small current-account surpluses and had higher-than-average expected rates of return at home. Although the flow of direct investment from the United Kingdom during this period was the largest in absolute terms, from  to  new flows accounted for a much smaller percentage of the direct investment position of the United Kingdom than that for Japan. Thus, while British investors probably also bought some low-return U.S. companies and encountered similarly high restructuring costs, these low returns would have been more than offset by higher returns on the United Kingdom's larger stock of more mature investments. A primary example of a mature investment is the British investment in petroleum, which has a diversified structure within the United States that includes both upstream and downstream activities. Investment in this industry has boosted the overall British . Heavy reliance on imports for immediate resale by U.S. affiliates of Japanese parents and, more generally, all U.S. affiliates' substantial dependence on imports for use in production, probably also contributed to reductions in rates of return from - because of the steep depreciation of the dollar.
